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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-IS "REASONABLE SUSPICION"
BECOMING "PROBABLE CAUSE"?
State v. Sarhegyi, 492 N.W.2d 284 (N.D. 1992)
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 6, 1991, Deputy Mitchell Burris was on routine
patrol in Fargo, North Dakota.' At approximately 1:30 a.m., Burris
noticed a lone vehicle parked among the tractors and combines on
the lot of Case International.2 Case International (Case), a farm
implement dealership, is located in a "somewhat isolated area at
the edge of Fargo."' 3 The dealership was closed for the night.4
Burris had not seen the car there when he had passed the lot ear-
lier in the evening.' The car's lights were off,6 and Burris was
unable to tell whether there was anyone in the vehicle.7 Con-
cerned that a burglary was in progress, that someone needed help,
or that the car was stolen, Burris drove into the lot to investigate
further.8 As he entered the parking lot, the driver of the car
turned on the car's lights and began to drive off the lot.9 Deputy
Burris activated the flashing red lights of his patrol car and
stopped the vehicle. 10 Burris then approached the car and asked
the driver, later identified as Roberta Sarhegyi, for her identifica-
tion.11 Sarhegyi stated that her driver's license was suspended and
gave Burris her name, address, and date of birth. 12 When asked
why she was in the parking lot at that hour, Sarhegyi stated that
she needed directions to North Fargo.' 3 Believing that Sarhegyi
was intoxicated, Burris administered several field sobriety tests to
1. Transcript of proceedings at 4-5, State v. Sarhegyi, 492 N.W.2d 284 (N.D. 1992) (No.
920031) [hereinafter Transcript].
2. Id. at 5. At trial, Deputy Burris testified that the car could be observed from the
roadway and that there was no indication that an attempt had been made to conceal the car
from the view of passers-by. Id. at 5 and 13-14.
3. Brief of Appellant at 4, State v. Sarhegyi, 492 N.W.2d 284 (N.D. 1992) (No. 920031)
[hereinafter Brief of Appellant].
4. Transcript, supra note 1, at 6.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 13.
8. Id. at 6-7.
9. State v. Sarhegyi, 492 N.W.2d 284, 285 (N.D. 1992). Deputy Burris testified that his
suspicions were further aroused when the vehicle began to leave as he approached.
Transcript, supra note 1, at 10. Deputy Burris testified that when Sarhegyi saw him pull
into the parking lot she immediately turned her car lights on and began to leave the
parking lot. Id. at 7.
10. Transcript, supra note 1, at 7.
11. Sarhegyi, 492 N.W.2d at 285.
12. Transcript, supra note 1, at 7-8.
13. Id. at 8.
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her.'4 Upon her failure to adequately perform these tests, Burris
arrested Sarhegyi for driving under the influence and also for
operating a vehicle while her driver's license was under
suspension. '5
In a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of
the stop, Sarhegyi argued that the stop was an illegal seizure
because the deputy possessed no articulable facts on which he
could base a reasonable suspicion that she had committed a
crime.' 6 The trial court upheld the motion to suppress,' 7 stating
that Burris had admitted that he had not received a report of a
prowler at that location, an alarm had not gone off at the dealer-
ship, and he had admitted that he had no reason to believe crimi-
nal activity was afoot when he stopped Sarhegyi.' 8 The state
appealed,' 9 contending that Burris possessed reasonable and
articulable suspicion of criminal activity because 1) Sarhegyi's car
was observed on the lot of a closed business in a somewhat isolated
area late at night; 2) Deputy Burris had not seen the car on the lot
when he passed the dealership earlier; and 3) Sarhegyi "immedi-
ately attempted to leave" when Burris drove into the lot. 2 °
Affirming the trial court's order, the North Dakota Supreme Court
held that the stop was invalid because the deputy lacked reason-
able suspicion that criminal activity had occurred, or was about to
occur, or that Sarhegyi was in need of assistance. 2'
14. Id. at 8-9. Deputy Burris testified that Sarhegyi had bloodshot eyes, a flushed face,
and slurred speech. Id. at 8. He also testified that Sarhegyi told him that she was drunk. Id.
15. Sarhegyi, 492 N.W.2d at 285. Sarhegyi was asked to perform an alphabet test, a
counting test and a balance test. Transcript, supra note 1, at 9. Deputy Burris testified that
Sarhegyi's performance of these tests indicated that she was under the influence of alcohol.
Id. Sarhegyi was also asked to perform an intoxilyzer test. Id. The transcript of the trial
court proceedings does not disclose the result of the test. Deputy Burris testified that he
ran Sarhegyi's name and date of birth through the computer in his car and confirmed
Sarhegyi's statement that her driver's license was under suspension. Id. at 9-10.
16. Sarhegyi, 492 N.W.2d at 285.
17. Id.
18. Appendix of Appellant at 10, State v. Sarhegyi, 492 N.W.2d 284 (N.D. 1992) (No.
920031) [hereinafter Appendix]. During cross-examination, Deputy Burris had testified
that other than his suspicions that a burglary was in progress, that Sarhegyi needed help, or
that the car was stolen, he did not have a reason to believe that Sarhegyi was committing or
had committed a crime. Transcript, supra note 1, at 15. There was no testimony on
whether there had been reports of crime in the past at Case International or the area
surrounding Case.
In its memorandum opinion, the trial court noted further that Deputy Burris had not
observed a traffic violation, Sarhegyi had not been slumped over the wheel of her car, and
she did not gesture for help. Appendix, supra, at 10. The court also stated that "'[t]he officer
was being helpful and the ultimate result was in the public's best interests, but under these
facts this Court can find no lawful basis for the stop." Id.
19. Sarhegyi, 492 N.W.2d at 285.
20. Brief of Appellant, supra note 3, at 4-5.
21. Sarhegyi, 492 N.W.2d at 286-88. The court stated that "[tihe problem in this case is
the officer's lack of reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was or was about to be afoot
or that a 'community caretaking function' required the stop." Id. at 286 (citation omitted).
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Unreasonable searches and seizures are prohibited by the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution22 and Arti-
cle I, Section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution.23 The goal
behind this prohibition is to protect the personal security of indi-
viduals against unwarranted governmental intrusions.24 To pro-
mote this goal, the United States Supreme Court set forth the
exclusionary rule, which provides that evidence obtained as a
result of an unreasonable search or seizure is inadmissible in a
court proceeding.25
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Terry
v. Ohio,26 a police stop which was not based on probable cause was
an unreasonable seizure and any evidence obtained in such a stop
was inadmissible against the defendant.2 ' The Terry Court stated
22. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
23. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 8. In State v. Phelps, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated
that "[t]he fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and Article
I, § 18 (sic) of the North Dakota Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures."
286 N.W.2d 472, 475 (N.D. 1979). In Phelps, officers forcibly removed Phelps' clothes and
searched them for glass fragments. Id. The court stated that the warrantless search was
unreasonable because the search was not incident to a lawful arrest, there was no danger
that evidence would be destroyed if the search was delayed until a warrant could be
obtained, and the forcible removal of Phelps' clothing "transcended even the most liberal
construction of a 'very limited' intrusion and invaded the shield of personal security that
our constitution was designed to protect." Id. at 477.
24. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966). In Schmerber, the United States
Supreme Court stated that "[t]he overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to
protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State." Id. In
Schmerber, a police officer, over Schmerber's objections, ordered hospital personnel to take
a sample of Schmerber's blood in order to determine whether Schmerber was intoxicated.
Id. at 758. The Court found the warrantless search reasonable because the intrusion upon
Schmerber's privacy interests was minimal, and to delay the search until a warrant was
obtained would likely have resulted in destruction of the evidence. Id. at 770-71.
25. The exclusionary rule was first announced in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914). In Weeks, officers had obtained a key to Weeks' house and conducted a warrantless
search. Id. at 386. The Court stated that the trial court had committed prejudicial error in
permitting the evidence obtained in the search to be used against the defendant at his trial.
Id. at 398. The Weeks Court noted that "[tihe tendency of those who execute the criminal
laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced
confessions.., should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts .... " Id. at 392. In a
later case, the Court stated that Weeks held that "in a federal prosecution the Fourth
Amendment barred the use of evidence secured through an illegal search and seizure."
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949). The exclusionary rule was made applicable to the
states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961), and was first applied by the North Dakota
Supreme Court in State v. Manning, 134 N.W.2d 91 (N.D. 1965). In Manning, the
defendant argued that the trial court erred in permitting the state to introduce evidence
obtained during a warrantless search of his residence. Id. at 94. The court found the
search illegal and the evidence obtained in the search inadmissible against Manning. Id. at
99.
26. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
27. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 37 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[P]olice officers up
to today have been permitted to effect arrests or searches without warrants only when the
facts within their personal knowledge would satisfy the constitutional standard of probable
cause."). See also 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.5
(a), at 239 (1984).
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that in the interest of crime prevention and detection, a police
officer who is investigating a possible crime could, "in appropriate
circumstances, and in an appropriate manner[,]" "approach" an
individual even if the officer does not have probable cause to make
an arrest.2 8
In Terry, Officer McFadden, a thirty-nine-year police force
veteran, observed two men taking turns walking back and forth in
front of a store, pausing to look in the store window each time they
passed.29 It appeared to Officer McFadden that the men were cas-
ing the store in contemplation of a robbery and he feared that
they were armed.30 McFadden confronted the men, grabbed
Terry, patted him down, and discovered a gun in Terry's coat
pocket. 31 Both men were arrested and subsequently convicted for
carrying concealed weapons.32 Terry appealed the trial court's
28. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. Specifically, the Court held that "where a police officer
observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience
that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous.... he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in
the area to conduct a carefully limited search ... of such persons .... Id. at 30.
Probable cause exists if the "facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge
and of which they ha[ve] reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient [in and of
themselves] to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that the [suspect] had committed or
was committing an offense." Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). Professor LaFave,
explaining the difference between the Terry "reasonable suspicion" standard and the
probable cause standard, stated that:
[T]he precise words used are not that critical, so that what is important is to
understand the manner in which the standard differs from the traditional arrest
standard .... [T]he Terry reference to when "criminal activity may be afoot"
justifies this conclusion: even though the arrest standard may sometimes require
that guilt be more probable than not, this is never the case as to a stopping for
investigation[,] [b]ecause the very purpose . . . is to clarify ambiguous
situations....
LAFAVE, supra note 27, § 3.8 (d), at 302.03. In Wibben v. North Dakota State Highway
Comm 'r, the North Dakota Supreme Court noted the distinction between the Terry reason-
able suspicion standard and the probable cause standard when it stated that the information
used to support an investigative stop need not support "the more exacting standard of prob-
able cause necessary to make an arrest." 413 N.W.2d 329, 331 (N.D. 1987).
29. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5-6.
30. Id. at 6. Officer McFadden had been assigned to a downtown area for 30 years,
watching for shoplifters and pickpockets. Id. at 5. McFadden observed two men standing
together on a street corner. Id. One of the men left the other and walked past a store,
paused to look in the window, turned and walked back to the corner, pausing again to look
in the store window. Id. at 6. The man walked back to the other and the two appeared to
converse. Id. The second man repeated the actions of the first. Id. The two men repeated
the "ritual alternately between five and six times apiece .... "' Id.
"At one point, while the two were standing together on the corner, a third man
approached them and engaged them briefly in conversation. This man then left the two
others .... [The first two men] resumed their measured pacing, peering, and conferring.
After this had gone on for 10 to 12 minutes, the two men walked off ... following the path
taken earlier by the third man." Id. Officer McFadden suspected the men were planning
to rob the store and decided to investigate further. Id. He approached the men and asked
their names. Id. at 6-7. One of the men mumbled a response, and Officer McFadden
grabbed Terry. Id. at 7.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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denial of his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from
McFadden's patdown 3
The Terry Court held that an officer who observes unusual
conduct may stop an individual if the circumstances are such that
an officer, in the light of his or her experience, could reasonably
infer that the individual was involved in criminal activity.34 The
Court noted that an "inarticulate hunch[]" and "simple 'good faith
on the part of the officer'" cannot serve as a basis for intruding
upon an individual's Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure.35 In United States v. Cortez,36
the Court stated that:
Terms like "articulable reasons" and "founded suspicion"
are not self-defining; they fall short of providing clear gui-
dance dispositive of the myriad factual situations that
arise. But the essence of all that has been written is that
the totality of the circumstances-the whole picture-
must be taken into account. Based upon that whole pic-
ture the detaining officers must have a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting the particular person
stopped of criminal activity.3
7
Some states have codified the Terry rule. For example, a Utah
state statute provides that:
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has com-
mitted or is in the act of committing or is attempting to
commit a public offense and may demand his name,
address and an explanation of his actions.38
North Dakota also has a statute that applies to the temporary
questioning of persons. Section 29-29-21 of the North Dakota
Century Code provides that:
A peace officer may stop any person abroad in a public
33. Id. at 4-5.
34. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. The Terry Court did not decide if Terry had been seized at
the point when Officer McFadden approached him and asked him for identification or
whether the seizure took place when McFadden grabbed Terry. The Court only stated that
"whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he
has 'seized' that person." Id. at 16.
35. Id. at 22.
36. 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
37. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981) (citations omitted).
38. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-15 (1988 & Supp. 1993). "This section thus permits a brief
investigatory stop of an individual by police officers 'when the officers "have reasonable
suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity ....
State v. Baumgaertel, 762 P.2d 2, 3-4 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
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place whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has
committed, or is about to commit:
1. Any felony.
2. A misdemeanor relating to the possession of a con-
cealed or dangerous weapon ....
3. Burglary or unlawful entry.
4. A violation of any [controlled substances] provision
39
The statute further provides that the officer may stop and
demand of a person whom she reasonably suspects of any of the
stated violations the individual's name, address, and an explana-
tion of her actions.4 ° If the officer suspects that the person is
armed, the officer may search the individual for weapons. 41 Sec-
tion 29-29-21 has been cited in only one case.42 Because a majority
of the North Dakota Supreme Court has never discussed the stat-
ute in a reported case, it is unknown if the circumstances listed in
section 29-29-21 are the only circumstances which will support a
finding of reasonable suspicion. Perhaps the court should explain
39. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-21 (1991).
40. Id. The Terry Court noted that it was not deciding whether investigatory stops
based on less than probable cause are constitutional. Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16
(1968). Thus, the Court did not decide whether an investigatory stop statute such as North
Dakota's is constitutional.
On November 3, 1992, North Dakotans voted on an initiative, MEASURE 6 (sobriety
checks), which if passed would have made illegal any stop not based on probable cause.
How North Dakota Voted on Tuesday, GRAND FORKS HERALD, Nov. 5, 1992, at 6A. The
initiated measure stated, in pertinent part:
This measure creates a new section to the North Dakota Century Code
which prohibits law enforcement officers from stopping or searching vehicles
and the occupants without probable cause. Evidence obtained in violation of
this measure is not admissible in any administrative, civil, or criminal
proceeding.
Currently, law enforcement personnel may stop vehicles when they have
reasonable suspicion that a violation has been committed. The officer may also
*'pat down" the occupants, if the officer has reason to believe the occupant is
illegally carrying a concealed weapon. If approved this measure would require
probable cause for all stops and searches. The amount and type of evidence
needed to establish probable cause is greater than that needed to establish
reasonable suspicion.
Sample Ballot, GRAND FORKs HERALD, Oct. 27, 1992, at 6D. The proposed initiative,
MEASURE 6, was defeated with approximately 60% of voters voting against the measure.
How North Dakota Voted on Tuesday, supra, at 6A. State v. Sarhegyi was decided on
November 5, 1992. Sarhegyi, 492 N.W.2d 284 (N.D. 1992).
41. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-21 (1991).
42. North Dakota Century Code section 29-29-21 was cited by District Judge Glaser in
his concurring opinion in State v. Klevgard, 306 N.W.2d 185 (N.D. 1981) (Glaser, J.
concurring). In Klevgard, Judge Glaser sat in place of Chief Justice Erickstad who had
disqualified himself from the case. Klevgard, 306 N.W.2d at 195. Glaser cited the statute as
providing authority for a temporary detention of persons found in circumstances which
create suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot. Id. at 196.
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why it never cites the reasonable suspicion statute when it is
deciding reasonable suspicion cases.
Although the North Dakota Supreme Court has never applied
the North Dakota reasonable suspicion statute, it has applied Terry
and has stated that "an investigatory stop is a seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.14 3 It has further noted that
an investigative stop of a vehicle does not violate the Fourth
Amendment if the officer has "an articulable and reasonable suspi-
cion that a law has been or is being violated." 4
Because there are different types of conduct in many varieties
of circumstances which may be deemed suspicious by an officer
who observes the conduct, it is difficult to articulate, with any mea-
sure of success, exactly what circumstances are suspicious enough
to justify an investigative stop.4 5 Most courts hold that an investi-
gatory stop of a vehicle which is observed in close proximity to a
closed business is an unwarranted Fourth Amendment intrusion
unless there has been a recent report of crime in the area, the area
is classified as a high crime area, or law enforcement officers have
been closely patrolling the area because of criminal activity.46 The
43. Wibben v. North Dakota State Highway Comm'r, 413 N.W.2d 329, 331 (N.D. 1987)
(citing Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). The Terry Court noted that "not all personal
intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons. Only when the
officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the
liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred." Terry, 392 U.S. at 19
n.16. The Terry Court also noted that "whenever a police officer accosts an individual and
restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person." Id. at 16. The North
Dakota Supreme Court has noted that a traffic stop is a seizure because "[a] traffic stop
significantly curtails the 'freedom of action' of the driver . . . " Sarhegyi, 492 N.W.2d at
285. Failure to stop when a law enforcement officer signals a driver to pull over is a crime
under section 12.1-08-02 of the North Dakota Century Code. Therefore, when a police
officer signals a driver to pull over, "[t]here is no choice but for a driver to stop. ." Id. at
286.
44. Wibben, 413 N.W.2d at 331. In Wibben, an anonymous caller reported that a
woman was sitting in her car in the parking lot of an apartment complex. Id. at 330. The
caller said that the woman appeared to be sick or drunk. Id. When the officer arrived, he
saw Wibben sitting in a car that fit the description given by the caller. Id. The officer
tapped on the car window, and Wibben rolled down the window. Id. The officer asked her
if she was all right and noticed that she appeared to be intoxicated. Id. The court stated
that the officer's personal verification of the details of the anonymous tip gave him
reasonable suspicion that a crime was being committed. Id. at 332-33.
45. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, § 9.3(c) at 436-37 (2d ed. 1987).
46. See id. at 456 (noting that courts upholding stops "frequently stress that the
observed circumstances occurred in a high crime area"). See, e.g., State v. Carter, 441
N.W.2d 640, 641 (Neb. 1989) (finding that even though the stop had taken place in a high
crime area that had been placed on extra patrol, the stop was unjustified because the most
recent crime had occurred two months before, and there had been no report of a crime
that night); State v. Rein, 453 N.W.2d 114, 115 (Neb. 1990) (upholding a stop in part upon
officer's testimony that there had been recent vandalism to buildings "in town"); State v.
Kavanaugh, 434 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Neb. 1989) (upholding a stop that took place in an area in
which there had been reports of burglaries and suspicious activities in the past); State v.
Fillion, 474 A.2d 187, 190 (Me. 1984) (upholding a stop occurring on lot of warehouse which
was on a list of premises officers were requested to check each night); State v. Baumgaertcl,
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North Dakota Supreme Court has taken a similar position, sug-
gesting that there must be a recent report of crime in the area in
order for such an investigatory stop to be valid.a One court has
further suggested that an officer may not simply testify that there
is a high incidence of crime in the area.4 8 Instead, the officer must
be able to testify that a particular crime, such as burglary, is preva-
lent in the area and that she stopped the suspect on the suspicion
that the individual was about to commit that particular crime. a9
In general, then, it appears that courts will find a stop unrea-
sonable unless it is made for the purpose of investigating past,
762 P.2d 2, 4-5 (Utah 1988) (upholding a stop in an area in which recent burglaries had
occurred).
47. See Sarhegyi, 492 N.W.2d at 286 (refusing to find reasonable suspicion when there
was no traffic violation, no indication of emergency and "no reports of criminal activity in
the area") (emphasis added). In an earlier case, Geiger v. Backes, 444 N.W.2d 692 (N.D.
1989), the North Dakota Supreme Court indicated that an investigatory stop is
unreasonable unless there has been a recent report of crime in the area. In Geiger, at about
2:40 a.m., a police officer observed Geiger's vehicle traveling slowly along a frontage road
adjacent to an industrial area that had been designated an "extra-patrol" area because of
recent thefts. Id. at 693. The officer followed Geiger's car and requested a registration
check on the vehicle. Id. The dispatcher informed the officer that the car was registered to
Geiger and that Geiger's driver's license was under suspension. Id. The officer stopped
Geiger and arrested him for driving while his license was under suspension. Id. The Geiger
court stated that because Geiger was driving slowly in an area that had been placed on
extra patrol because of recent crimes late at night and further because a registration check
showed that Geiger's license was under suspension, the officer had "reasonable suspicion of
a potential violation of the law." Id. at 693-94. However, the area in which Geiger was
observed and the fact that the area had been placed on extra patrol may not have been key
factors in the court's decision to uphold the stop. No reported case has suggested that an
officer must observe a traffic violation or suspect the driver of a vehicle of a crime in order
to request a registration check on a vehicle. Arguably, a registration check is not a search or
seizure which must comport with Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirements
because a registration check poses no greater invasion on an individual's privacy than does
the perusal of a telephone directory in an attempt to ascertain a person's address or phone
number. Therefore, the Geiger court could have upheld the stop solely on the basis that the
officer had probable cause to stop Geiger when the registration check showed that Geiger's
driver's license was under suspension.
48. See People v. Lathan, 113 Cal. Rptr. 648, 650-51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974). InLathan, at
about 10:15 p.m. an officer observed Lathan stop his car on a parking lot near a liquor store.
Id. at 650. The officer was unable to tell whether the liquor store was open. Id. Lathan got
out of his car, put his hands underneath his jacket behind his back as if he were placing
something there, walked to the door of the store and knocked several times. Id. Lathan
then "looked in numerous directions and at one point turned to his right and looked over
his shoulder" in the direction of the officer. Id. Lathan immediately walked to his car and
drove away. Id. at 650. The officer stopped Lathan and subsequently discovered a weapon
under the seat of Lathan's car. Id. In finding the stop illegal, the Lathan court noted that
while the officer had testified that the stop was made based on his knowledge of crime in
the area at that time of night and on his observations of Lathan's actions, the officer "did not
indicate the type of 'crime' involved in that area or infer that he had knowledge of any
report of a particular crime committed or being committed there ..... Id. at 651. Further,
the court noted that the officer had not described the crime rate at that location. Id.
Professor LaFave agrees with the view that an officer must be able to state with
particularity the crime problem that exists in the area, and notes that "[u]nspecific
assertions that there is a crime problem in a particular area should be given little weight, at
least as compared to more particular indications that a certain type of criminal conduct of
the kind suspected is prevalent in that area." 3 LAFAVE, supra note 45, § 9.3 (c), at 457
(footnote omitted).
49. Lathan, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 650-51.
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ongoing or in-progress crimes. However, Professor LaFave, with
what appears to be an opposite view, has suggested that the Terry
Court recognized that police officers cannot perform the task of
crime prevention if they have authority to make a stop only when
they have reason to believe that a crime has been or is being
commmitted.50 That position was adopted by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in State v. Anderson.5 1  The Anderson court
upheld a stop in which the individual was not suspected of a par-
ticular crime, stating that "nothing in the fourth amendment...
requires that a police officer's suspicions relate to particular crimi-
nal activity." 2
In addition to addressing whether there must be a recent
report of criminal activity in the area in which the stop is made,
courts have discussed whether innocent reasons for the individ-
ual's conduct must be ruled out before reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity may be established. In United States v. Soko-
low, 5 3 the Supreme Court noted that while each factor in a set of
circumstances may appear innocent, when taken together the cir-
cumstances may warrant further investigation.5 4 The Court also
noted that " 'wholly lawful conduct might [in some circumstances]
justify the suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.' "" In United
States v. Cortez,56 the Court stated that when considering the
validity of a stop, a court must consider all of the circumstances
surrounding the stop.5 7
Similarly, in United States v. Holland,8 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals noted that when suspicious conduct is observed,
50. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 45, § 9.2 (a), at 349-50 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 35(1968) (Douglas, J. dissenting)). In Terry, the Court did not specifically state that reasonable
suspicion cannot exist unless the area in which the stop takes place is a high crime area or
the officer is investigating a recent report of crime. Therefore, those who infer that a high
crime area is a factor necessary to a finding of reasonable suspicion cannot claim support
from Terry.
51. 454 N.W. 2d 763 (Wis. 1990).
52. State v. Anderson, 454 N.W.2d 763, 767 (Wis. 1990). In Anderson, the officers did
not suspect Anderson of a particular crime; the sole issue was whether flight at the sight of
officers in and of itself can create reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. at 764.
Anderson is discussed in greater detail infra note 83.
53. 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
54. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9 (1989).
55. Id. at 9 (citation omitted). "[I]nnocent behavior frequently will provide the basis
for a showing of probable cause ... " Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243-44 n.13 (1983). "In
making a determination of probable cause the relevant inquiry is not whether particular
conduct is 'innocent' or 'guilty,' but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types
of noncriminal acts." Id. The Sokolow Court noted that "[the Gates] principle applies
equally well to the reasonable suspicion inquiry." Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 10.
56. 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
57. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).
58. 510 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1975).
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officers are not required to rule out all innocent reasons for the
conduct before making a brief stop and request for identifica-
tion.59 The Holland court noted further that even if it is equally
probable that the suspect has not committed a crime, officers must
be allowed to stop and question before their reasonable belief of
criminal activity is verified by the suspect's escape or the comple-
tion of the crime. 0
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has adopted the view of the
Holland court. In State v. Jackson,6 the Wisconsin court stated
that:
Jackson suggests that his actions do not necessarily imply
wrongful conduct, and that the record allows other
equally reasonable inferences of an innocent nature.
Doubtless, many innocent explanations for Jackson's con-
duct could be hypothesized, but suspicious activity by its
very nature is ambiguous. Indeed, the principal function
of the investigative stop is to quickly resolve the ambigu-
ity and establish whether the suspect's activity is legal or
illegal. In this regard, LaFave points out that the suspects
in Terry "might have been casing the store for a robbery,
or they might have been window-shopping or impatiently
waiting for a friend in the store." We conclude that if any
reasonable suspicion of past, present, or future criminal
conduct can be drawn from the circumstances, notwith-
standing the existence of other inferences that can be
drawn, officers have the right to temporarily freeze the
situation in order to investigate further.6 2
Terry supports the Wisconsin court's conclusion. In Terry, the
Court noted that "[t]here is nothing unusual in two men standing
together on a street corner, perhaps waiting for someone ...
Store windows, moreover, are made to be looked in."'63
Conversely, one court has suggested that if there has not been
a recent report of crime in the area, an officer observing a person
in close proximity to a closed business must rule out innocent rea-
sons for the individual's presence in the area by checking any
building suspected of having been burglarized for signs of forced
59. United States v. Holland, 510 F.2d 453, 455 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, Holland v.
U.S., 422 U.S. 1010 (1975).
60. Id.
61. 434 N.W.2d 386 (Wis. 1989).
62. State v. Jackson, 434 N.W.2d 386, 391 (Wis. 1989) (citation omitted).
63. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-23.
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entry.6 4 In State v. Messer, a police officer saw Messer's truck
parked on a dimly lit end of a mall parking lot at 3:45 a.m.6 5 The
truck was parked close to the wall of a retail store.66 The officer
could see two people sitting in the truck.6' All of the stores in the
mall, including a bar, were closed. 8 Concerned that a burglary
was in progress, the officer approached the truck and spoke with
the occupants.69 The officer saw a knife on the seat between the
two occupants, and, concerned for his safety, ordered Messer and
his passenger out of the truck.7 0 During the subsequent search of
the truck, a bag of cocaine was found.7 1 In finding the stop illegal,
the Messer court stated that "[a]t the time of the stop [the officer]
knew only that defendant and his passenger were parked in an
empty parking lot early in the morning .... He did not check the
retail store to determine if there was evidence of a forced entry,
and he had not received a report of any burglaries in progress. "72
The Messer court appears to require that one officer detain the
suspect while another checks nearby buildings for signs of forced
entry. However, it is likely that most courts would hold that such a
detention is a seizure, and such a seizure may not take place with-
out reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The reasonable sus-
picion standard requires that factors that suggest that the stopped
individual is involved in criminal activity must be present before
the stop is made. 3 Further, a requirement that one officer detain
the suspect while another check for evidence of a crime is unwork-
able in jurisdictions which have as few as one officer on duty dur-
ing any given shift.
When faced with facts similar to those in Messer, a Penn-
sylvania court reached a different conclusion. In Commonwealth
v. Stratton, 4 officers observed Stratton standing in the doorway of
a closed laundromat early in the morning.75 When Stratton saw
the officer, he left the doorway and began walking away at a "fast
64. State v. Messer, 692 P.2d 713, 714 (Or. Ct. App. 1984).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Messer, 692 P.2d at 714.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981) (stating that officers must
have a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the ... person stopped of criminal
activity") (emphasis added).
74. 331 A.2d 741 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974).
75. Commonwealth v. Stratton, 331 A.2d 741, 741-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974).
1993] 1009
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
pace."76 The Stratton court upheld the stop, noting that "[g]ood
police work under these circumstances would demand an investi-
gation and . . . a stop and frisk."'77 The Pennsylvania Superior
Court, indicating its unwillingness to place impractical restrictions
on police officers, stated that "[i]t would be the height of absurdity
to conclude that the police officer should have alighted from his
vehicle, walked up the walkway to check the door, decided
whether his suspicions were aroused and only then pursued the
defendant, all of this occurring as the defendant was removing
himself hurriedly from the scene. "7
The North Dakota Supreme Court has also provided a stan-
dard under which law enforcement officers are to determine
whether reasonable suspicion exists. In Geiger v. Backes,79 the
court cited Sokolow and stated that law enforcement officers need
not weigh each factor separately in determining whether there is
reasonable suspicion for a stop; instead officers are to consider the
"totality of the circumstances" as these circumstances unfold and
use their law enforcement training and experience to determine
whether the circumstances create reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. 0
Although most courts generally agree that an officer need not
rule out innocent reasons for the suspicious conduct, courts disa-
gree on whether an attempt to avoid contact with a law enforce-
ment officer gives rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Some courts have stated that while evasive conduct alone does not
give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, flight at the
sight of a police officer coupled with other suspicious circum-
stances may create reasonable suspicion.8 ' Further, the Wisconsin
76. Id. at 742.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 742-43.
79. 444 N.W.2d 692 (N.D. 1989).
80. Gieger v. Backes, 444 N.W.2d 692, 693 (N.D. 1989).
81. E.g., People v. Wells, 676 P.2d 698 (Colo. 1984) (en banc). In Wells, an officer
observed Wells' vehicle backed up against a tractor-trailer in a warehouse parking lot. Id.
at 700. The officer became suspicious that a theft was in progress and drove into the
parking lot to investigate. Id. As he entered the lot, Wells, "apparently aware that he had
been seen by the officer, attempted to leave .. ." Id. at 702. The court stated that an effort
to avoid police "'coupled with an officer's specific knowledge connecting that person to
some other action or circumstance indicative of criminal conduct' " gives rise to reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. Id. (citation omitted). The officer's observation of Wells'
attempt to force open the trailer door, coupled with Wells' effort to leave when he saw the
officer, created a "sufficiently particularized basis in fact for stopping the defendant in order
to briefly investigate the circumstances of his conduct." Id. See also State v. Fry, 831 P.2d
942, 946 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991) ("The fact that Fry attempted to leave when he saw the
officers does not, without more, supply the officers with a reason to conclude that crime was
afoot.") (emphasis added); State v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 824, 827 (Minn. 1989) ("[The]
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Supreme Court suggested in State v. Anderson8 2 that while flight
alone could never provide probable cause to arrest, flight does
give rise to a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be
afoot.s3 As a result, the Anderson court noted that flight alone may
justify an investigative stop because flight is a strong indication of a
guilty mind. 4
Thus, while some courts have found that that evasive conduct
trooper did not base his decision to stop solely on the fact that the defendant made a quick
turn ... after he looked the trooper in the eye.").
In People v. Bower, 597 P.2d 115, 117 (Cal. 1979), a group of people who had been
talking together dispersed upon seeing police officers. One of the men walked away
quickly, " 'almost a run,'" through a passageway. Id. The officers stopped this individual
and subsequently discovered that he was carrying a concealed weapon. Id. at 117-18. The
California Supreme Court stated that persons are free to avoid contact with the police
unless the police "have the power to insist upon an encounter-that is, [the] officer has the
power to 'detain .... " Id. at 121. This power, the court noted, does not exist unless the
officer has adequate cause for a stop. Id. The Bower court thus indicated that evasive
conduct in and of itself cannot support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. at
122.
82. 454 N.W.2d 763 (Wis. 1990).
83. State v. Anderson, 454 N.W.2d 763, 766 (Wis. 1990). In Anderson, police officers
observed Anderson driving his vehicle in an alley behind a restaurant. Id. at 764. Anderson
lived above the restaurant and usually parked his car in the alley. Id. Upon seeing the
officers, Anderson "turned south into an adjoining alley, attaining a speed of approximately
ten to fifteen miles per hour." Id. He then turned onto a city street, "attaining a speed of
approximately thirty miles per hour." Id. The trial court did not call this action "flight" but
noted that Anderson had "proceeded in a very hast[y] fashion away from the officers ......
Id. at 767 (alteration original).
The court concluded that "Anderson's evasive behavior in avoiding police contact
alone justified the temporary stop[,]" id. at 768, and noted that:
[F]light at the sight of police is undeniably suspicious behavior. Although many
innocent explanations could be hypothesized as the reason for the flight, a
reasonable police officer who is charged with enforcing the law as well as
maintaining peace and order cannot ignore the inference that criminal activity
may well be afoot. Although it does not rise to a level of probable cause, flight at
the sight of a police officer certainly gives rise to a reasonable suspicion that all is
not well. Under these circumstances, "[i]t would have been poor police work
indeed for an officer ... to have failed to investigate this behavior further."
Id. at 766 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968)). Because Anderson's conduct
arguably was not fast, erratic, or extreme, it may be argued that Anderson suggests that
flight need not be fast, erratic, or extreme in order to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity. However, the Sarhegyi court took Anderson a step farther and cited
Anderson as support for the proposition that "courts have held that mere avoidance of a
police car is insufficient unless erratic, fast, and extreme." State v. Sarhegyi, 492 N.W.2d
284, 287 (N.D. 1992) (citing State v. Anderson, 454 N.W.2d 763 (Wis. 1990)).
It may also be argued that while the Anderson court stated that flight in and of itself
may give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the court instead considered the
totality of the circumstances when it determined that reasonable suspicion existed. Argua-
bly, Anderson could be interpreted as support for the proposition that the totality of the
circumstances supported a finding of reasonable suspicion because the officers reasonably
believed that Anderson was returning home and would therefore stop in the alley rather
than driving past them. Further, the concurring opinion in Anderson stated that the trial
judge had not concluded that Anderson's conduct constituted flight, but instead had found
reasonable suspicion "because it was 2:00 a.m., Anderson avoided the police, he was speed-
ing, and it was in an alleyway behind business areas." Anderson, 454 N.W.2d at 769 (Hef-
fernan, C. J., concurring).
84. Anderson, 454 N.W.2d at 768.
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does not create reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be
afoot, other courts have declined to adopt that view.
III. ANALYSIS
The Sarhegyi court stated that when determining whether an
investigative stop is reasonable, "[t]he reviewing court must (1)
determine whether the facts warranted the intrusion of the indi-
vidual's Fourth Amendment rights, and if so, (2) determine
whether the scope of the intrusion was reasonably related to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." '
Noting that an investigatory stop is justified if the officer has "'an
articulable and reasonable suspicion' that a law has been or is
being violated, '8 6 the court found that Deputy Burris did not pos-
sess reasonable suspicion of criminal activity because Sarhegyi had
not committed a traffic violation and there had been no report of a
crime in the area. 7 The court also noted that there were no cir-
cumstances which suggested that Sarhegyi was in need of emer-
gency assistance. 8  By this, the Sarhegyi court has indicated a
85. Sarhegyi, 492 N.W.2d at 286 (citations omitted).
86. Id. (citations omitted).
87. Id.
88. Id. Stops made for the purpose of ascertaining the welfare of an occupant of a
vehicle have been called "community caretaker" stops. Wibben v. North Dakota State
Highway Comm'r, 413 N.W.2d 329, 331 n.1 (N.D. 1987). A United States District Court has
stated that "the physical and psychological intrusion upon the stopped motorist ... is the
same regardless of whether the police officer has a penal or regulatory purpose, or a benign
purpose of rendering assistance." United States v. Dunbar, 470 F. Supp. 704, 706 (D. Conn.
1979). However, the Dunbar court indicated that when a stop is made for benign purposes,
the individual's interest in being free from governmental intrusion is balanced against the
government's interest in ascertaining the individual's welfare. Id. Thus, the Dunbar court,
while stating that the degree of intrusion upon the motorist is the same no matter the
purpose for the stop, suggested that the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity standard
applies to stops in which the motorist is suspected of a crime, and a lesser standard applies if
the officer is attempting to ascertain the welfare of the motorist.
In Wibben, the North Dakota Supreme Court suggested that when a community
caretaker stop is challenged, the reasonable suspicion standard applies only if the stop has
the dual purposes of crime investigation and ascertainment of an individual's welfare. 413
N.w.2d at 331 n.1. Thus, the reasonable suspicion standard applies to a vehicle stop if the
officer is concerned that the occupant of the vehicle is ill and, in addition, suspects that the
individual may be intoxicated. Further, following Dunbar, the Wibben court noted that if
the officer does not suspect the occupant of committing or having committed a crime, the
reviewing court will determine the validity of the stop by balancing the state's interest in
investigating the officer's reasonable suspicion that the individual may be ill or injured
against the individual's privacy interest. Id. at 331 n.1, 333.
Other courts have circumvented the issue of whether the reasonable suspicion
standard must be applied to community caretaker stops by finding that a community
caretaker stop is not a seizure because the officer is not using a show of authority to stop the
individual. In People v. Murray, 560 N.E.2d 309, 311-12 (Ill. 1990), the court stated that a
"'Terry' stop ... must be supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity .... [A
community caretaking stop] involves no coercion or detention and therefore does not
involve a seizure." The court stated that " '[because] the person to whom the questions are
put remains free to... walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that person's liberty or
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new-found inclination to narrow the investigatory stop standard of
reasonable suspicion, because Terry did not require a showing that
the stop was made in a high crime area or that the officer was
investigating a report of crime when the stop was made.s9 The
narrowing of the standard of reasonable suspicion brings the stan-
dard closer to the probable cause standard, which requires that the
officer have a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed
or is being committed. 0
Conversely, individuals who believe that the reasonable suspi-
cion standard is a doormat for the police and has historically given
law enforcement officers too much power and discretion may be
reassured by the Sarhegyi decision which possibly suggests that
the standard does in fact have some "bite."
The Sarhegyi court also took the position that an attempt to
avoid contact with a law enforcement officer alone does not estab-
lish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.9' Courts in other
jurisdictions have ruled similarly;92 however, those courts have
also indicated that flight plus other circumstances can lead to a
finding of reasonable suspicion.9" Had the Sarhegyi court chosen
privacy as would under the Constitution require some particularized and objective
justification.'" Id. at 312 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 N.S. 544, 553 (1980)).
The Sarhegyi court stated that in order for a community caretaker stop to take place,
there must be indicia of an emergency. 492 N.W.2d at 286. The trial court had found that
Sarhegyi had not "gesture[d] for help nor was she slumped over the wheel[;]" thus there
was no indication that an emergency existed. Trial court memorandum at 2, State v.
Sarhegyi, 492 N.W.2d 284 (N.D. 1992) (No. 920031). At trial, Deputy Burris had testified
that when he first viewed the vehicle he was unable to tell whether it was occupied.
Transcript, supra note 1, at 13. The Sarhegyi court thus suggests that if an officer observes a
parked vehicle under suspicious circumstances and cannot tell whether the vehicle is
occupied, the officer may approach the vehicle in order to ascertain whether there are
occupants in need of assistance; however, if the driver/occupant(s) become aware of the
officer's presence and drive off before the officer makes contact, the occupants of the
vehicle are presumed to not need assistance.
89. See supra note 50. The North Dakota Supreme Court suggested in Geiger that a
recent report of crime is necessary to support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
See supra note 47. Another state court has indicated that an investigatory stop of a vehicle
which is observed on the lot of a closed business late at night is not reasonable unless there
is a high crime rate in the area or the officer is investigating a report of crime when the
vehicle is observed. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
By narrowing the standard of reasonable suspicion set forth in Terry, the North Dakota
Supreme Court is indicating that the North Dakota State Constitution provides greater
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than does the United States
Constitution. In Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967), the United States Supreme
Court stated that individual states constitutions may impose "higher standards on searches
and seizures than required by the Federal Constitution ...." The North Dakota Supreme
Court cited Cooper with approval in State v. Stockert, 245 N.W.2d 266, 271 (N.D. 1976),
noting that "[i]ndividual States are free to impose higher standards than the Federal
Standards."
90. See supra note 28.
91. See Sarhegyi, 492 N.W.2d at 286 ("The fact that Sarhegyi moved her car when
Deputy Burris approached is not sufficient to justify a stop.").
92. E.g., State v. Fry, 831 P.2d 942, 946 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991), discussed supra note 81.
93. E.g., People v. Wells, 676 P.2d 698, 702 (Colo. 1984), discussed supra note 81.
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to recognize that a vehicle parked on the lot of a closed, somewhat
isolated business late at night is a circumstance which justifiably
gives rise to a suspicion that all is not well, the court could have
found that those circumstances, coupled with Sarhegyi's attempt
to avoid contact with Deputy Burris, created reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity.94 However, by indicating that flight can lead
to a finding of reasonable suspicion only if the flight is fast, erratic,
or extreme and thus viewing flight in a vaccuum rather than con-
sidering flight plus other circumstances, the Sarhegyi court tight-
ened the standard of reasonable suspicion.
In its opinion, the court cited People v. Freeman95 for the
proposition that an individual violates no law by stopping on a
public parking lot, unless the property is posted against trespassing
or the individual has been ordered off the property by the
owner. 96  The Freeman court indicated that because there are
innocent reasons why people might stop their vehicles on parking
lots late at night, there must be some other "specific, objective
facts" in addition to presence on the premises in order to support
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.97 One could argue that
both the Freeman and Sarhegyi courts would find that presence on
the lot of a closed business alone can never support a reasonable
suspicion of crime, because it is not a violation to be on unposted
property, and there are "innocent" reasons why persons may stop
on the parking lot of a closed business. Following this line of rea-
94. Alternatively, the court could have found that because Deputy Burris had decided
to stop Sarhegyi prior to her attempt to avoid him, the avoidance was not a factor included
in Deputy Burris' decision to stop; therefore, it was unnecessary to determine whether
Sarhegyi's act of avoidance created reasonable suspicion. See State v. Baumgaertel, 762
P.2d 2, 4 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (noting that "the deputy's observation of the driver's
'evasive' behavior... was made after the deputy decided to follow the vehicle, and, thus,
did not enter into the facts upon which he based his suspicion of criminal activity[]").
95. 320 N.W.2d 878 (Mich. 1982).
96. Sarhegyi, 492 N.W.2d at 287. The Freeman court stated that:
A lone automobile idling in a darkened parking lot late at night does not, without
more, support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. People may
temporarily stop their automobiles in such locations for a variety of reasons: to
rest, to check directions, to rendezvous with others, to converse, etc. It is not an
offense for an individual to be upon the private property of another unless he has
entered "after having been forbidden so to do by the owner or occupant" or
refused to depart after having been told to do so.
Freeman, 320 N.W.2d at 880. However, the stop at issue in Freeman involved a vehicle that
was parked on a residential, not commercial, parking lot. Id. at 879. Professor LaFave
distinguishes presence on residential premises from presence on commercial property, sug-
gesting that "something more than presence in immediate proximity to [residential] prem-
ises will ordinarily be required, for persons have occasion to enter and exit their residence
at all hours." 3 LAFAVE, supra note 45, at 441.
97. Freeman, 320 N.W.2d at 880. The court stated that "a report linking a vehicle of
the same description to recent criminal activity" is a factor that would be specific and
objective. Id. Thus, the Freeman court appears to suggest that investigatory stops should
be used solely for purposes of crime investigation, not crime prevention.
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soning, the Sarhegyi court thus requires an officer to rule out inno-
cent reasons for the individual's activity, with the arguable result
that the officer must reasonably believe that a crime is being com-
mitted, rather than merely possess an articulable reason for her
belief that criminal activity is afoot. Whether it appears that the
individual was attempting to secret her presence from the view of
passers-by, or whether the lot at issue is a parking lot in a largely
residential area, as opposed to a lot in a commercial area which has
little traffic at night, appears to be irrelevant to the two courts.
The Sarhegyi court seems to suggest that unless there is a recent
report of crime in the area, a traffic violation, or there are indica-
tions that an emergency exists, an investigatory stop of a vehicle
which has been observed on the lot of a closed business late at
night is not justified.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
In order to prevent burglaries and other crimes, many law
enforcement agencies have a general policy that requires officers
on the night shift to closely patrol businesses.98 Although it is
unknown whether the North Dakota Supreme Court would accept
the articulation of a general extra patrol of businesses as support
for an investigatory stop of a vehicle which was observed on the lot
of a closed business late at night, Sarhegyi indicates that absent a
recent report of a particular type of crime, the stop is unjustified.
Because the court requires a recent report of crime in the area,
the court suggests that an investigatory stop may be used only to
investigate past or on-going crimes and may not be used for crime-
prevention purposes. In essence, the criminal is given "one free
shot." After a crime has been committed in an area, officers may
stop suspicious vehicles, but until a crime has been reported, a stop
is unjustified. Because probable cause consists of a reasonable
belief that a crime has been or is being committed, 99 and, as Terry
indicates, reasonable suspicion may be based on a reasonable
belief that a crime is about to be committed, the Sarhegyi court,
by requiring a report of recent crime in the area to justify a stop
based on reasonable suspicion has blurred the distinction between
reasonable suspicion and probable cause by bringing about the
98. Thomas C. Durrett, Burglary Prevention Concepts, LAW AND ORDER, Sept. 1987,
at 26 (noting that because lack of eyewitnesses makes it difficult to solve nighttime
burglaries, police need to deter burglaries of closed businesses).
99. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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odd result that reasonable suspicion cannot exist unless a crime has
already occurred or is in progress.
As a result of the Sarhegyi decision, an officer who observes a
vehicle parked under circumstances which suggest that a burglary
may be in progress may not stop the vehicle if it begins moving
upon his approach unless the driver commits a traffic violation. If
no violation is committed, the officer will have to simply note the
car's tag number for future reference. This could obviously
impose onerous burdens on the police if it is later discovered that
the business has been vandalized or burglarized, because the
officer will have to hope that the owner of the vehicle was driving
the car at the time it was observed and that the owner's name and
address on file in the computer represent the correct information,
or it may be impossible to locate the driver at a later date.
The Sarhegyi court found that a brief stop made in order to
identify the driver of a vehicle observed on the lot of a closed busi-
ness late at night is an unreasonable seizure, and that finding sug-
gests that the court might hold that investigatory stops may not be
used for the purpose of crime prevention or detection. In future
cases, the court may distinguish between circumstances in which
the business directly abutted a well-travelled street or was located
in an isolated area, but the Sarhegyi court did not indicate that the
area in which the business was located could be a factor in deter-
mining reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The court simply
indicated that because there are innocent reasons why a person
might stop her vehicle on private property, a stop of a person
viewed leaving the lot of a closed business late at night is an unrea-
sonable seizure unless the person is observed committing a viola-
tion, there is a recent report of crime in the area, or it appears that
the officer's assistance is needed.
The Sarhegyi decision indicates that the court is willing to
hypothesize reasons for the individual's conduct and that the
officer may not stop an individual unless she has eliminated all pos-
sible innocent reasons for the person's activity. Further, the court
indicated that an attempt to avoid conduct with the officer can
never give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity unless
the evasive action is fast, erratic, or extreme. This information will
provide would-be criminals with an incentive to remain calm
when they are caught in the act. More importantly, as a result of
the Sarhegyi decision, a law enforcement officer may not stop a
vehicle unless she is investigating a report of a crime or there has
been a recent report of crime in the area. The officer may not
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make an investigatory stop unless she knows that there have been
recent crimes in the area and she observes the individual make an
overt action indicative of crime.
Therefore, the Sarhegyi decision will make it more difficult for
law enforcement officers to pursue their crime prevention and
detection duties. The decision will give defense attorneys ammu-
nition with which to argue for suppression of evidence obtained in
stops made for these purposes. As result of the Sarhegyi decision,
the line between reasonable suspicion and probable cause, while
never clear, is blurred to the point of extinction.
Loralyn Eckelberg Clark

